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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
JAMES S. DEVINE, MRS·. J'AMES
S. DEVINE and JANET GUSINDA,
Plaintiffs and AppeUants,
-vs.-

Case No. 8145

HELEN COOK and W. S. HATCH
CO., INC.,
Defen~datnts

and Respondents.

BRIEF· OF· APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an action arising out of an automobile collision in which the automobile owned and driven by the
plaintiff, James S. Devine, collided with an automobile
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driven by the defendant, Helen Cook. The collision occurred at the intersection of 1500 South Street, Bountiful,
Utah and U. S. Highway 91, (Tr. 5, 6). The plaintiffs
were all in the car proceeding north going to Ogden on
U. S. 91; the defendant Helen Cook had been pToceeding
east on 1500 South Street and had come to a stop at the
stop sign where said street intersected with the through
highway. A tank truck and four-wheel trailer and a tractor pulling a semi-trailer transporting a tank owned by
the defendant W. S. Hatch Company had also been proceeding north on U. S. Highway 91, but had slowed down
and one of the trucks had come to a stop in preparation of
turning left to go west on 1500 South St., (Tr. 7, 15, 16).
Although the driver of the first truck stated that he did
not remember motioning or signalling to Mrs. Cook to
proceed across the intersection, (Tr. 174) Mrs. Cook and
a witness, Elora Hutchings, both testified that the driver
had motioned or signalled to Mrs. Cook to clear the intersection, (Tr. 50, 60). The truck drivers stated that they
could not make a left turn until Mrs. Cook had cleared
the intersection, (Tr. 174, 175). The defendant Cook
stated that upon being signalled by the truck drivers to
clear the intersection she proceeded across U. S. Highway 91 until she passed in front of the truck, at which
time she first noticed the automobile of the plaintiff.
Then it was too late to avoid the collision, (Tr. 61). The
plaintiff, James S. Devine, testified that the two tankers
had previously passed his automobile; however, as they
approached the intersection they began to slow down and
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he assumed that they were either going to stop or make
a left turn, and he likewise began to slow down. As he
overtook the last tanker he glanced between the· two
trucks and saw a flash or a blur and he immediately put
on his brakes, pulled over to the right shoulder of the
road but he was unable sufficiently to stop his car to prevent the collision, (Tr. 16). The left front of the D·evine
car collided with the right front of the Cook car.
At the time of the collision Mrs. Devine stated that
she was riding in the front seat, sitting sideways with
her back toward the right hand front door talking to her
sister who was riding in the back seat, (Tr. 68). As a
result of the collision Mrs. Devine received a fractured
rib, ( Tr. 70), a fractured metatarsal bone in the foot and
a tooth was knocked loose, which resulted in the nerve
becoming dead and required extraction thereof and a
replacement with an artificial tooth by means of bridge
work, (Tr. 69). The plaintiff, l\!iss Gusinda received
various bruises and bumps and co1nplained of pain in her
back and it was later determined or diagnosed that she
'\Vas suffering from a ruptured inter-vertebral disc, ( Tr.
122, 150). In addition to general pain and soreness in the
area of her back upon three separate occasions prior to
the time of trial, the disc had protruded into the spinal
column, causing severe pains and temporary or partial
paralysis, or inability to use her legs, (Tr. 89, 91, 150).
The plaintiff, Dr. Devine, is seeking to recover damages
to his auto1nobile and personal injuries suffered as a result of a 1noderate brain concussion, (Tr. 22), caused
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from a blow upon his head, and all of the plaintiffs are
seeking special damages in addition to their general
damages.
The defendants 1n their answer denied negligence
and also pleaded contributory negligence of Dr. James S.
Devine as being the sole and proximate cause of the collision and resulting injuries. The case was tried before a
jury which returned a verdict of no cause of action as to
all three plaintiffs. Although the defendants did not
specifically plead any contributory negligence on the part
of. Mrs. Devine and Miss Gusinda, passengers in the
automobile driven by Dr. Devine, the court permitted the
defendants p-rior to instructing the jury to amend their
pleadings to allege contributory negligence on the part
of such passengers, ( Tr. 188), and the court then proceeded to instruct and submit to the jury the issue· of
contributory negligence as to all of the plaintiffs.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE INSTRUCTIONS PREJUDICIALLY ACCENTUATED THE DUTY OF THE PLAINTIFFS AND MINIMIZED
THE DUTY OF THE DEFENDANTS.

POINT II.
IT WAS ERROR TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON AN
ISSUE OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF THE PLAINTIFFS, MISS GUSINDA AND MRS. DEVINE.
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POINT III.
THE COURT'S INSTRU·CTIONS REGARDING CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE WERE ERRONEOUS AND PREJUDICIAL.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE INSTRUCTIONS PREJUDICIALLY ACCENTUATED THE DUTY OF THE PLAINTIFFS AND MINIMIZED
THE DUTY OF THE DEFENDANTS.

Instruction No. 1 contained the statement of .the
court as to the allegations of the plaintiffs concerning
negligence of the defendants and the answer of the defendants alleging contributory negligence on the part of
the plaintiff, James s. Devine.
Instruction No. 2 concerned the burden of proof and
the necessary allegations which must be proved by the
plaintiffs and specifically mentioned that the court would
further instruct the jury "relative to contributory negligence as it applies respectively to the plaintiffs."
Instruction No. 3 defined the terms: negligence,
contributory negligence and proximate cause.
In Instruction No. 4 the court specifically instructed
the jury as to the issue of contributory negligence and in
so doing in part stated as follows:
"You are instructed that if you find by a
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preponderance of the evidence that Dr. James S.
Devine was guilty of contributory negligence,
which in any degree contributed to the happening
of this accident, he cannot recover even though
you find that one or both of said defendants was
negligent in the happening of this collision. It is
the law of this state that a plaintiff who is negligent and such negligence proximately contributes
to the hap·pening of the accident in question that
he cannot recover. Therefore, you are instructed
that if you find Dr. Devine was negligent, as I
have above indicated, and the same proximately
contributed to the happening of the collision he
cannot recover."
The court, in the same instruction, advised the jury
that if Dr. Devine's negligence was the sole proximate
cause of the collision then the other two plaintiffs could
not recover against the defendants. The court continued
as follows.:
"In this connection you are further instructed
that if you find either one of the woman plaintiffs
quilty of contributory negligence which in any degree proximately contributed to the happening of
the collision then and in that event such plain tiff
so guilty cannot recover."

So far as the above instructions go they would not
be objectionable except as argued in Point III. !-lowever, in reviewing the balance of the instructions which
in two other separate and specific instructions again
instructs on the issue of contributory negligence there
app~ears to be prejudicial error.
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Instruction No. 5 contains a general instruction as to
the operation of vehicles upon the highway with reference
to speed, starting, stopping, slowing down, turning, keeping a proper lookout, etc. Such instruction as applied
to all of the parties was no doubt proper. However, Instruction No. 6 again reverts to the issue of contributory
negligence on the part of the two plaintiffs who were
passengers in the automobile. The instruction provided
as follows:
"You are instructed that it is the duty of
guests in an automobile to use all reasonable precautions for their own safety, and in the discharge of such duty, they are required to see and
t:o w~arn the driver of the automobile in which they
are guests of the dangers which a reasonable and
prudent person riding as a guest in the automobile
of another would use for his own safety; and if
they fail to use such reasonable care they are
negligent, and if such negligence possibly contributes to any extent, howeveT slight, to produce
their injury they cannot recover. Thus in this
case, if you find that at the time of the collision
and resulting injuries, if any, the plaintiffs, Janet
Gusinda and l\1:rs. James S. Devine, or either of
the1n, were guests in the automobile driven by
James S. Devine, and that a reasonable and prudent person under all of the facts and circunlstances as shown by the evidence should have seen
the danger of the collision which caused their injuries, if any, and would have warned James S.
Devine of such danger, and that by such seeing and
warning, the collision and injuries, if any, 1nay
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have been averted, and that they, or either of
them, fa.iled to see the danger or failed to wa.rn
James S. Devine of it, and that such negligence
. contributed to produce the collision and resulting
injuries, if any, then the person who was guilty
of such negligence cannot recover for her injuries,
and your verdict in the action brought by her must
be in favor of the defendants and against the
plaintiffs." (Emphasis added.)
It will be noted by the foregoing instruction that
the court commences the instruction by stating that it is a
positive duty of the guests to see and to warn the driver
if, under the circumstances a reasonable and prudent
person would do so, and then particularly identifies
these plaintiffs and again repeats that if they failed to
see or warn the driver such conduct would constitute
negligence and would bar their recovery. Contrast this
instruction with Instructions No. 7 and No. 9 pertaining
to the duty of the two defendants and again the Instruction No. 8 a.s to the duty of the driver Dr. D·evine. Instruction No. 7 was as follows :

"You are instructed that a driver of a vehicle
upon a highway has no duty to ascertain or advise
other drivers whether they may safely enter upon
or pass over said highway; but if the driver undertakes to make such a determination and does
so advise others, then he· must exercise reasonable caution, circun1spection and care that his
conclusions are correct." * * *
The Court then proceeded to discuss whether W. S.
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Hatch Company, through its drivers, did undertake to
determine whether the defendant, Helen Cook, could safely enter and pass through the intersection. The instruc-

tion proceeds first with the negative that there is no
duty except under certain circumstances.
Instruction No. 8, pertaining to the duty of James S.
Devine, provided in part as follows :
"You are instructed that it was the duty of
James S. Devine in driving down the highway toward the intersection in which this collision occurred to keep a reasonable and adequate lookout, * * * to use reasonable care * * * to a void the
hazzards. * * * It was the plain tiff James S. Devine's duty to observe the relative position of
other vehicles on the highway, the existence of the
intersection, and to proceed -in such a manne-r that
he would keep his vehicle under reasonable control and prevent the same from colliding with
other objects or vehicles lawfully upon the highway. If you find that the plaintiff J'ames S. Devine at said time and place failed to exercise reasonable control of the vehicle he was driving, then
he would be negligent." (Emphasis added.)
This specific narrative type instruction discussing the
conduct of the plaintiff, James S. Devine, was unnecessary in view of Instruction No. 5 covering the duties of
drivers generally, and Instruction No. 4 on Contributory
Negligence. Again note the positive nature of the instruction as to 'vhat was required of the plaintiff.
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The eontrast between Instruetion No. 8 and Instruction No. 9, which follows, is again significant:
"You are instructed that the law does not require a person to be extraordinarily alert, or to
foresee all that can be seen by looking back after
the happening of an accident. Where a person
exercised reasonable and ordinary caution; that is,
a degree of care, which would ordinarily be exercised by a reasonable and prudent person, he is
not negligent. In this case, the defendant, Helen
Cook, was not under a duty to foresee all that she
might at this time be able to foresee or appreciate by looking back at the accident, nor w:as she
required to use extraord'im.ary caut:ion for the
avoidance of any injury that she could reasonably
have expected under the circumstances. If you
find from the evidence in this case that this defendant did observe that degree of care and caution that should be ordinarily observed by ordinarily prudent persons under similar circumstances, then you are instructed that the defendant, Helen Cook, discharged the duties imposed
upon her and you should return a verdict in her
favor." (Emphasis added.)
It will again be noted that the instruction is by its terms
negative.
Instructions No. 4, 6 and 8 pertaining to the standard of care and contributory negligence are positive
and peremptory, while Instructions 7 and 9 pertaining
to the standard of care required of defendants are negative and nugatory.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Instruction No. 10 is a general instruction that there
are sometimes collisions which are unavoidable accidents
and if the jury found that this collision was caused not
by any negligent conduct of any of the parties they could
find that it was an accident. The balance of the instructions are stock instructions or deal with the issue of damages.
The instructions cast doubt upon the case of the
plaintiffs by frequent use of the words "if any" in reference to the collision and injuries. As an example part of
instruction stated as follows:
"Thus in this case, if you find that at the time
of the collision and resulting injuries, if amy, the
plaintiffs Janet Gusinda and Mrs. James S. Devine, or either of them, * * * should have seen
the danger of the collision which caused their injuries, if any, * * * and that by such seeing and
warning, the collision and injuries, if any, * * *
and that such negligence contributed to p~roduce
the collision and resulting injuries, if any, * * *"
(Emphasis added.)
No such qualifying terms were used when referring
to negligent conduct of these plaintiffs. Rather the concluding part of the instruction states:
"And that they, or either of them failed to see
the danger or failed to warn James S.. Devine of
it, and that such negligence contributed to produce
the collision and resulting injuries, if any, then
the person who was guilty of such negligence,
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cannot recover for her injuries and your verdict
in the action brought by her must be in favor of
the defendants and against the plaintiffs." (Emphasi~ added.)
By such qualifying terms the court cast doubt as to
the existence of any injuries suffered by the plaintiffs
and characterizes the conduct of the plaintiffs as being
negligent. This accentuation of the defendant's case,
as included in the instruction requested by the defendants,
was .one more. factor tending to discredit the claim of
the plaintiffs and obviously caused the jury to believe
that the court thought the plaintiffs were negligent and
their alleged injuries were fallacious.
In addition to emphasizing the p·ositive requirements
and duties of the plaintiffs and stating in the negative
manner the duties of the defendants the court continually
and rep·etitiously instructed the jury concerning the contributory negligence of the defendant. The court not
only mentioned the issue of contributory negligence in
the first instruction pertaining to the allegations of the
plaintiffs, in the second instruction dealing with the burden of proof, and in the third instruction in defining
the terms., but specifically instructed the jury as to the
contributory negligence of the plaintiffs in three of the
other instructions pertaining to liability. Instructon No.
4 discusses contributory negligence of all of the plaintiffs,
Instruction No. 5 deals with the general duty of all
drivers, Instruction No. 6 the contributory negligence of
the plaintiffs, Miss Gusinda and Mrs. Devine, and InSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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struction No. 7 the duty of the truck drivers. And then
again in Instruction No. 8 the court returned to the issue
of contributory negligence of the driver James S. Devine.
In Instruction No. 9 the court minimized the duty of the
defendant, Helen Cook, and in Instruction No. 10 discusses unavoidable accidents. Punctuated throughout the
entire group of instructions as to liability is the continual
and repetitious discussion of contributory negligence.
The court in the case of Keeshin Motor Express Co.,
Inc. et al v. Glassman, 219 Ind. 538, N.E. 2d 842, 850
had occasion to consider repetition of instructions as a
ground of reversible error. The court reviews in some
detail cases on this subject matter and cites at page 853
of the North Eastern 2d Reporter numerous cases which
granted a reversal on the sole ground of repetition of instructions. Other cases are cited where repetition of instructions was one of the grounds for reversal. The
court held as follows:
"With this situation it was incumbent upon
the trial court in his instructions to clarify the issues without giving any of them undue prominence. This was not done. The instructions as a
whole are lengthy, intricate, repetitious, argun1entative and confusing. The tend, to appellant's
disadvantage, by needless repetition to draw the
jury's consideration away from the conduct of appellee's brother and to lead the jury to believe
th~t, in the court's opinion, what he did or failed
to do was of little consequence."
rrhe TJ tah court in the case of Shields v. Utah Light
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& Traction Co. 99 Utah 307, 105 P. 2d 347, 349 stated that
"the reiteration of given p·ropositions to the jury in the
instructions does not have judicial approval." After reviewing in some· detail the instructions the court held:

"And the resulting emphasis on applicable
laws unfavorable to plaintiff's side as the result
of continual reference and repeating of certain
law p·ropositions resulted in the unbalancing of the
charge, and error."
·Certainly continual repetition of instructions on contributory negligence and the positive delineation of the
duties of the plaintffs, as contrasted with the qualified
negative statement of the duties of the dtfendants, only
p·ermitted the jury to return its verdict of no cause of
action. T·he instructions taken as a whole, even assuming
they were correct as given, constitutes prejudicial error.

POINT. II.
IT .WAS ERROR T·O INSTRUCT THE JURY ON AN
ISSUE OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF THE PLAINTIFFS, MISS GUSINDA AND MRS. DEVINE.

As previously stated the defendants did not plead
contributory negligence on the part of the two passengers
in Dr. Devine's automobile. Only after the case had been
tried and the court had indicated the instructions 'vhich
were to be given, and upon objection· by counsel for the
plaintiff that the issue of contributory negligence was not
supported by the pleadings or the evidence, were the
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pleadings amended to raise the issue of contributory
negligence as to each of these two plaintiffs. It is subnlitted that the evidence did not support any instruction
on this issue. No witnesses other than the plain tiffs
themselves gave any testimony concerning their conduct
or what happened so far as these plaintiffs were concerned. The complete testimony of these two witnesses,
as to what they observed and what they did prior to the
collision indicates that there was no basis for the charge
that they did not act as reasonable and prudent persons.
Mrs. Devine testified as follows :
"A.

I was talking to my sister who was In the
back seat. I was sitting sideways and I noticed the two big oil tankers passing us up
and then they began to slow down and I noticed that our car was slowing down ; and then.
I was looking at the oil tankers and I noticed
this blur, and then I felt our car brakes being
put on and the next thing I heard was coming
to and trying to get air, trying· to· breathe, but
my lungs and chest wouldn't expand enough
and I thought I was dying.'' (Tr. 68).

Upon cross examination the witness, Mrs. Devine,
testified as follows:

"Q. You were looking out the window, out the
front window all the tirne ~
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A.

No, I · was sitting sideways in the car, talking to my sister and looking out at the tankers.
Q. And you were looking out the- side at the tankers, is that correct~ As you were going from
Salt Lake to the point where the accident occurred, were you observing the highway~
A. Yes.
Q. Did you see Mrs. Cook's car prior to the collision~·

A. Yes.
Q. Did you assume that to be the car that you
later collided with~
A. After I came to, yes.
Q. Now did you say anything to your husband
about that car~
A. Well, I imagine so. I don't get excited that
way.

Q.

Pardon~

A. I idon't become excited that way.
Q. · In othe-r words, you didn't become excited
so you didn't say anything to your :husband
about the car then~
A. No.
Q. You didn't tell him about this blur you saw
crossing the highway~
A. No, because he had p·ut on the brakes at the
same time that I saw it." (Tr. 79).
The testimony of the plaintiff, Miss Gusinda, was as
follows:
"A.

Well, we were coming down this road, we were
on our way to Ogden and we were driving
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abreast of. these two tanker trucks. I think
we were behind the second one and at first
they were passing us and then we started to
gradually catch up to them and I remember
that at the time I thought I saw a wheel or
s_ omething on the other side of the road. I am
rather mixed up on that part of it. Anyway,
I thought the first truck went on and that
this car came off of the side road and that was
the one that hit us, that went in front of the
trucks ; the second truck cleared it."
Q. Alright. Where were you just prior to the collision~

A.

I was sitting in the back seat of the car, just
about in the middle." (Tr. 86).

And on cross examination the witness further testified:

"Q. Now returning for the 1noment to the accident,
I believe you stated that you saw a wheel or
something, some part of a car coming across
the highway~
A. Yes, sir, I thought I did. But I don't know if
it is hearsay or if it is what I heard after the
accident.
Q. But your impression is that you saw a car
coming across the highway~
A. Yes.
Q. You didn't say anything to the driver of the
car in which you were riding, DT. Devine,
about it, did you~

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

18
A.

But at the time the brakes were being applied." ( Tr. 97).

The foregoing testimony, being all of the evidence
of any negligence of these two plaintiffs, does not sho":
any lack of due care, or failure ,to act ws a reasonable
prudent person would have acted under the circumstances. If there is no evidence of contributory negligence, the law is clear that· the jury should not be instructed on such an issue.
In Christensen v. Oregon Shortline Railroad Comp,any, 35 Utah 137, 146, 99 P. 676, the court quoted with
approval the following:
"Where the evidence of negligence is entirely
inferential and the testimony for the defendant
is clear and undisputed to the effect that there
was no negligence, the plaintiff's case is overcome
as a matter of law, and it becon1es the duty of the
Judge to take the case from the jury."
In this case there is no evidence on the part of the
two passengers but rather their undisputed testimony
shows no negligence and therefore the court should not
have instructed the jury as to any contributory negligence
on their part.
In White v. City of Trilnidad, 52 Pac. 214, 10 Colo.
App. 327, the court discussed the issue of submitting
an instruction on contributory negligence even though
there was no pleading or sufficient evidence to support
the instruction. The court stated as follows :
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"The evidence concerning her lameness was
the only evidence by which contributory negligence was sought to be proved; and, while the
evidence was inadmissable under the pleadings,
it, for the purpose for which it was elicited, was
a failure. It proved nothing against the plaintiff.
But the jury may have regarded it as important,
and as having a bearing on her right to a recovery,
when they listened to the instruction of the court
on the subject of contributory negligence. Instructions must be based on evidence. A correct declaration of the law is erroneous when there is no
evidence to which it can be applied. It can have no
effect except to mislead the jury, and, where an
instruction of that nature has been given, we are
bound to pTesume that the jury were misled by it.
('Citation of Authority) The judgment must be
reversed."
In Smith v. Oregon and N.W.R. Co., 33 Utah 129, 142,
93 P. 185, the court held that where there was a plea of
contributory negligence but there was no evidence on
which to predicate a charge on contributory negligence
such an instruction should not have been given and also
giving an instruction concerning an intervening cause
without evidence to support the same constituted prejudicial error.
In Belnap v. Widdison, 32 Utah 246, 90 P. 393, 395
the court stated:
"The rule is well settled that instructions
should be predicated upon the pleadings and evi-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

20
dence in the case, and that an instruction, even
though it may contain a correct statement of the
law in the abstract, if it has no application to the
issues and evidence in the case, should be refused.
The reason for the rule is that instructions not
pertinent to the case have a tendency to mislead
the jury and to draw their minds from the issues
in the case. The instruction, while it correctly
states the law as an abstract proposition, has no
application whatever to the facts in this case and
was therefore erroneous, and the giving of it could
not have been other than p·rejudicial to the interests of the plaintiff."
The court held in the recent case of Clay v. Dunford,
239 P. 2d 1075, that it was prejudicial error to instruct
on the issue of assumption of risk when the facts in the
case did not present such an issue. Likewise, it was prejudicial error in this case to instruct on the issue of contributory negligence as to the two passengers of the
automobile, even assuming the- instruction was valid as
given. It is submitted however that the instructions were
invalid as discussed hereinafter and also under point
III.
By their testimony it i~ admit_ted t4at these plaintiffs
did not distinctly see the car driven by the defendant,
Mrs. Cook, and that they had no opportunity and did not
warn the driver of their vehicle. Yet in spite of this the
court instructs the jury as to contributory negligence of
these plaintiffs without any further evidence of negligence or violation ·of a duty of reasonable care. The instruction is such that it amounts to a direction to the
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jury to find these two defendants contributorily negligent. Instruction No. 6 stated:
"You are instructed that it is the duty of
guests in an automobile to use all reasonable
precautions for their own safety, and in the discharge of such duty, they are required to see and
to warn the d,river of the automobile, in which they
are guests, of dangers which a reasonable and
prudent person, riding as a guest in the automobile of another would use for his own S"afety,
and if they fail to use such reasonable care, they
are negligent, and if such negligence proximately
contributes to any extent, however slight, to produce their injury, they cannot recover. Thus, in
this case, if you find that at the time of the collision and resulting injuries, if any, the plaintiffs,
Janet Gusinda and Mrs. James S. Devine, or
either of them, were guests in the automobile
driven by J'ames D. Devine, and that a reasonable
and prudent person under all the facts and circumstances as shown by the evidence would have
seen the danger of the collision which caused their
injuries, if any, and would have warned James S.
Devine of such danger, and that by such seeing
and warning, the collision and injuries, if aJYli!J,
may have been averted, and that they, or either of
them, failed to see the danger or failed t.o wa,rn
Ja1nes S. Devine of it, and that such negligence
contributed to produce the collision and resulting
injuries, if any, then the person guilty of such
negligence cannot recover for her injuries, and the
verdict in the actions brought by her must be in
favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff."
J\.lthough the instruction refers to conduct of a reason-
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able person under the circumstances there can be no question but what the instruction as worded and given left
the imp-ression with the jury that the guests had a duty to
see and to warn the driver.· Yet the witnesses testified
that they had not seen the automobile clearly enough to
know that it was an automobile and that they had not
had an opportunity to warn the driver. Under such circumstances the instruction p-ractically amounted to a
direction to find the plaintiffs guilty of contributory
negligence. The law does not require that guests of automobiles observe, see and warn everything that might he
a danger in the path of the vehicle .

. In Cento et al. v. S.ecurity Building Co., 99 s. W. 2d
1, (Mo. 1936) the plaintiff sought to recover damages
sustained as a result of boards loaded in an elevator
protruding through the top of the elevator and coming in
contact with a beam across the top of the elevator shaft
which caused the boards to buckle, break and strike the
plaintiff. The jury found the case in favor of the defendant and a motion for a new trial was granted in favor of
the plaintiff and the defendant appealed. One of the
reasons for granting the new trial was an instruction
on contributory negligence to the effect that the plaintiff should have observed the condition of the elevator
shaft. The court's discussion concerning this point was
as follows:
"We now take up· the defendant's instructions
3 and 6 which plaintiff says were erroneous and
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justified the court in granting the new trial. Instruction 3 told the jury that it was plaintiff's duty
to exercise ordinary care to observe the condition
of the elevator and shaft and that if it were found
that, by the exercise of ordinary care, plaintiff
would have observed the conditions existing inside
the elevator shaft and that plain tiff did not observe the conditions inside the shaft, 'then his
failure to do so was negligence.' This instruction,
in effect, was peremptory, because plaintiff admitted that he did not give any attention to the
shaft, insofar as looking up the shaft was. concerned. If he had looked, he would have seen that
there was a beam over the shaft only a few feet
at most above the tops of the boards."
The court then discusses evidence which may have
justified a proper instruction on contributory negligence
and stated as follows:
"'These questions are legitimate subjects for
argument on the usual instruction on contributory
negligence, but to peremptorily direct, in effect,
that if plaintiff, under the facts here, did not discover the beam, he was guilty of negligence, we
think was error."
Note the similarity of the instruction in the Missouri
case with Instruction No. 6 in the present case. The
~lissouri court instructed the jury that if the plaintiff in
the exercise of ordinary care would have observed the
beam across the elevator 8haft and did not observe such
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condition "then his failure to do so was negligence."
In Instruction No. 6 the Utah court instructed the jury
that "they are required to see and to warn the driver of
the automobile" of such danger which a reasonable and
prudent p'erson would have done and if "they or either
of them failed to see the danger or failed to warn James
S. Devine of it" and such negligence contributed to produce the collision and resulting injuries, the plaintiffs
would be guilty of negligence and the jury must return a
verdict in favor of the defendants. and against the plaintiffs. The effect of such an instruction could only be to
place undue importance and a higher degree of duty upon
the plaintiffs. which, coupled with the repetition of instructions on contributory negligence, must have influenced the jury to determine that there was in fact contributory negligence and therefore they felt compelled toreturn their verdicts of no cause of action.
The Missouri case in its decision reyjewed a similar
case of Crawford v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co., 215
Mo. 394, 114 S.W. 1057, 1062, where the plaintiff was
charged with contributory negligence in failing to obS'erve gates on a stock pen near the railroad tracks. The
testimony was that the plaintiff was watching the cattle
in the railroad car and did not look and see or observe
the gates. The Missouri court quoted the following from
the Crawford case:
"The evidence shows that when he was coming down the stairway he would have seen them
if he had looked, and it also ·shows th.at he did
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not look, but that, on the contrary, he came
down the stairway with his mind on the cattle,
leaning over the railing with his face turned
south. If the plaintiff sa\v the gates open, he
was guilty of negligence in not taking care to
avoid coming into collision with them; but the
testimony is that he did not see them. Was he
negligent because he did not look in that direction as he came down the stairwayf As a general
rule a man is not required to look for . danger
when he has no cause to anticipate danger, or
when danger does not exist except as caused
by the negligence of another."
In this case the passengers were under no duty to
anticipate danger caused by the negligence of others,
nor were they under any duty to specifically observe
the condition of the road, or other vehicles thereon and
to be prepared to warn the driver when there was no
prior knowledge of any danger. Yet the court in effect
so instructed the jury. The parties admitted that they
did not see or obserye the danger and did not have
an opportunity to warn the driver. The court in substance instructed the jury that if they did not see and
observe the danger and warn the driver they were contributorily negligent. Such an instruction peremptorily
informed the jury that they must find a verdict against
the plantiffs.
The pleadings and theevidence did not support an
instruction on contributory negligence of the two passengers. The instructions as given were prejudicially
erroneous.
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POINT III
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS RE'GARDING CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE WERE ERRONEOUS AND PREJUDICIAL.

Instruction No. 4 provided in part as follows:
"You are instructed that if you find by a preponderance of the evidence that Dr. James S.
Devine was guilty of contributory negligency
which in any degree contribute1d t'o the happenmg
of this accident, he cannot recover even though
you find that one or both of said defendants. were
negligent in the happening of this collision. * * *
In this connection you are further instructed that
if you find either one of the woman plaintiffs
were guilty of contributory negligence which itn
OIYII!J degree promixately contributed to the hapP'ening of the collision, then and in that even
·such plaintiff so guilty cannot recover." (Emphasis added)
Instruction No. 6, in part, provided as follows:

"* * * and if they failed to use such reasonable care, they are negligent, (JJY/)d if such negligence proximately contributes to a;ny extent, however slight, to produce their injury, they cantnot
recover." (Emphasis added)
The words "to any extent, however slight" or "in
any degree" as used in the instructions, have been considered by many courts including the Utah S-upreme
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ever slight" or "to any extent" or "in any degree"
may qualify negligence but not proximate cause.
Slight negligence which is a proximate cause may
be a defense, but negligence which is a slight cause is
not a defense. The vital distinction between thes two
rules is set f.orth in ·a comment note a.t 114 A.L.R. 830,
the title of which is "The doctrine of comparative negligence and its relation to the doctrine of contributory
negligence," wherein it is stated as follows:
"While the contributory negligence of the
plaintiff, however slight, will defeat his right to
recover, if it was the proximate or the concurrent cause of his injury, it will not defeat that
recovery if it merely remotely caused or contributed to the injury."
The law is clear that contributory negligence of
plaintiff, however slight, will defeat recovery; and also
that negligence must be a proximate and not a remote
cause of the plaintiff's injuries to defeat recovery. T·o
say that this causal relation n1ay be sufficient, however
slight, or which contributes in any extent or in any
degree, is to permit negligence remotely causing or
slightly affecting injury to defeat recovery. The instruction requested by the defendants and given by the
court in this case sets forth this latter rule and, hence,
the instruction was prejudicially erroneous.
Where plaintiff's contributory negligence is a rernote cause, it does not preclude recovery. See Am.
Jnr. 896, Negligence, Section 212. In 65 C.J.S. 742,
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Section 129, the necessity of the existence of proximate
cause is thus stated.
"It is not sufficient that the negligence for
which plaintiff is responsible contributed to cause
the injury complained of. In order to be contributory negligence, such negligence must be a
proximate cause of the injury. It must be proximate to the injury in the same sense in which
defendant's negligent act or omission must have
been proximate to the injury in order to give a
right of action.
"The necessity of proximate causation between the negligence for which plaintiff is responsible and the injury of which he complains has
been expressed in various ways. Thus, it has
been said that no negligence is contributory un.less it contributes 'substantially,' or 'essentially,'
or 'materially,' or 'directly,' or 'materially and
essentially,' as well as 'directly,' to the injury;
and it must be one of the 'direct,' 'pToducing' or
'efficient' causes of the injury, 'part of the efficient cause,' or a cause 'without which the injury
would not have occurred.' The use of these and
similar expTessions to distinguish the proximate
from the remote cause of the injury have been
held to be neither erroneous or misleading, but
at least one court has taken the contrary view
with resp·ect to the terms 'material' and 'efficient.' "
The modern tendency is not to use the words direct,
material, or efficient in defining proximate cause, but
rather as is stated in the Restatement of the Law
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Torts, S.ection 431, the contributing circumstance must
he a substantial factor in the chain of causation. The
Utah Supreme Court in the case of Coray v. Southern
Pacific Company, 112 Utah 166, 185 P. 2d. 935, discussing the question of proximate cause quoted from the
Restatement of the Law of Torts, Section 431, comment (a) as follows:

"The negligence must also he a substantial
factor as well as an actual factor in bringing
about the plaintiff's harm. The word 'substantial' is used to denote the fact that the defendant's conduct has such an effect in producing the
harm as to lead reasonable men to regard it as
a cause, using that word in the proper sense in
which there always lurks the idea of responsibility, rather than in the so-calld 'philosophic
sense,' which includes every one of the great
number of events without wh~ch any happening
would have occurred. Each of these events is a
cause in the so-called 'philosophic sense,' yet
the effect of many of them is so insignificant that
no ordinary n1ind would think of them as causes."
Also, see Cox v. Tho1npson 254 P. 2d. 1947, 1051, which
applies the substantial factor test.
The substantial factor test in determining proximate
cause is applied the same whether determining negligence or contributory negligence. Section 465, Restaternent of Torts, states as follows:
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self to danger or his failure to exercise reasonable care for his own protection is a legally
contributing cause of his harm if, but only if,
it is a substantial factor in bringing about his
harm and there is no rule restricting his responsibility because of the manner in which his conduct contributed to his arm." (Emphasis added)
There is a considerable difference between a definition which states that it must be a substantial factor as
contrasted with the instructions given in this case where
it is stated that any act on the part of the plaintiffs
"which in any degree contributed to the happening of
his accident" or "which in any degree proximately contributed to the happening of the collision" or "such
negligence proximately contributes to any extent, however slight, to produce their injury."
In Rush v. Lagomarsino, 237 P. 1067, 196 Cal. 308,
the court discussed instruction of a similar nature and
stated as follows :
" ( 3) The trial court further erred in the

same instruction when it charged the jury that
any fault or negligence on the part of the plaintiff, 'which may in OJYI1J wise have contributed to
the accident,' would preclude a recovery by the
plaintiff. The vice of this instruction is that it
ignores the important qualification that, in order
to defeat a recovery, the negligence of the plaintiff must have contributed proximately to the
injury. F'ernandes v. Sacramento Ciy Ry. Co.,
52 Cal. 45. The error of this instruction was
accentuated by the further charge of the trial
court that:
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'When the negligence of the injured party
contributed to the injury complained of the
law will afford no redress, and if, therefore,
you find in this case that plaintiff was negligent and such negligence contributed to the
injury complained of, I instruct you that
the plaintiff cannot recover against the
defendant.'
"The negligent act or omission of a plaintiff
which vvill exculpate a defendant frorr1 responding
to the plaintiff in damages resulting from the
plaintiff's negligent act or omission must be a
contributing, proximate cause of the damages.***
"While it is true that the trial court, prior
to the giving of the instructions immediately
under consideration, gave a definition of contributory negligence which included the element
of proximate cause, neverthless, the instructions
complained of "\Vere so specifically and emphatically at variance with the requirements of the rule
relating to contributory negligence that there is,
we think, no escape from the conclusion that they
must have confused and 1nisled the jury to the
prejudice of the plaintiff." (Emphasis added)
In Rainer Heat & Power Compa;n;y v. City of Seattle,
193 P. 233, 236, 113 Wash. 95, the court stated as follows:

"It is contended in behalf of the appellant
that the trial court erred in its instruction to
jury as follows:
'If the plaintiff was guilty of any act of
negligence alleged against it in the answer
of the defendant city, which contributed iln
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any m~er to the d·amages to said heating
plant for which plaintiff sues, it is your duty
to deny the plaintiff the right to recover
any ·damages to said heating plant.'
"We have italicized the words to be particularly noticed~ The instruction, we think is erroneous under the decisions of this court in
Spurrier v. Front Street Cable Ry. Co., 3 Wash.
659, 29 Pac. 346, Cowie v. S·eattle, 22 Wash. 659,
62 Pac. 121, and Atherton v. Tacoma Ry. & Power
Co., 30 Wash. 395, 71 Pac. 39; the instruction
p,utting upon the appellant a higher degree of
care than the law burdens it with. Appellant's
contributory negligence may not have been the
proximate cause of the damage, and still it might
have been a slight condition contributing to the
damage in some manner. If its negligence contributed only in such small degree, such negligence would not prevent recovery."

In Di Nucci v. Hager, 184 ·Or. 555, 200 P. 2d 380, a
verdict was rendered in favor of defendant and thereafter the trial court granted a motion for new trial.
On app·eal this )~tter order was affirmed. The court had
given an instruction similar to the one set forth in this
point and held that the giving thereof was error and
stated:
"In instructing the jury, however, that if
they found that plaintiff was proceeding at a
speed which was greater than that provided for
by the basic rule, and if such negligence was the
cause of, or contributed in the slightest degree to
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the proximate cause of the accident, then their
verdict must be for the defendant, we think error
was committed that necessitated setting aside the
verdict rendered by the jury in favor of the
defendant." (Emphasis added)
The Utah Supreme Court recently had occasion to
consider a similar instruction in the case of Johnson v.
Lewis et al, 240 P. 2d. 498. However, in that case the
words "which in any manner, however slight," modified
the conduct of the party rather than proximate cause.
The instruction specifically stated in part as follows:
"Contributory negligence is an act or omission of the plaintiff which in any manner, however slight, proximately contributed to cause the
injury or damage of which he complains."
The court properly construed the instruction to the
effect that the word "which in any manner, however
slight," modified the preceding words "act" or "omission" and held, according to the distinction heretofore
discussed, that slight negligence may be sufficient as
a defense while slight causation would not be sufficient.
The court in discussing the above mentioned instruction
stated as follows:
"The jury was told that contributory negligence is 'any act or omission of the plaintiff
which in any manner, however slight, proximately
contributed to cause the injury.' The phrase
''vhich in any manner, however slight,' is probably
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technically correct and would do no harm if the
jury, in spite of it, kept in mind that there must
be a ngeligent act, that is, an act which lacks
ordinary care; and that such act must proximately contribute to cause the injury, that is,
it must, as a natural and continual sequence
unbroken by any new or intervening cause produce the injury complained of. But it seems hard
to reconcile an act which has those causal qualities as being one which 'in any manner, however
slight,' causes or even proximately contributes to
cause the injury. In other words, it seems in
order for an act to constitute negligence and
proximately contribute to the causing of an injury it would have to be an effective cause thereof
and not merely a slight cause of such injury.
This phrase is calculated to belittle the causal
relationship necessary between the contributory
negligence of the plaintiff and the accident and
tends to induce the jury to forget that such contributory negligence must be the result of a
negligent act, and ·a contrbuting proximate cause
of the injury and therefore tends to confuse
rather than enlighten the jury on that problem.
"This tendency would not be so objectionable
if ·the sa1ne type of phrase were used in describing the causal relationship required between the
defendant's negligence and the accident or injury.
But no such phrase was used in instructing on
defendant's negligence."
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tion was given 1n defining negligence and proximate
cause as to the defendants.
Instructions No. 4 and 6 in the present case clearly
used the phrase under discussion to modify proximate
cause rather than negligent conduct. In Instruction No.
4 it was stated "contributory negligence which in any
degree contributed to the happening of this accident."
In Instruction No. 6 it was stated "contributory negligence which in any degree proximately contributed to
the happening of the collision" **** "and if such negligence proximately contributes to any, extent, however
slight, to produce their injury, they cannot recover."
It cannot therefore be argued in this case that the instruction is even technically correct and in view of the
other instructions concerning contributory negligence,
as herein discussed, the giving of such instructions could
only constitute prejudicial error.
CONCLUSION
The instructions as a whole accentuated, emphasized
and magnified the issue of contributory neglegence. After generally mentioning the issue in the first three instructions the court, giving instructions requested by
the defendants, repetitiously returned to the issue
almost as if it wrus a chorus to be sung after each other
instruction. Instructions No. 4, 6 and 8 in detail, generally and specifically, analyze, dissect and discuss contributory negligence. Instruction No. 5 applied equally
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to all parties. Instructions No. 7 and 9 minimized, depreciated and belittled the duty of defendants. Instruction No. 10, as an anchor man, discussed unavoidable
accident. Without more the layman jury must have felt
compelled to return verdicts of no cause of action.
F·actually, and based upon the pleadings, there was
no justification to instruct the jury on an issue of contributory negligence of the p~laintiffs, Miss Gusinda and
Mrs. Devine. Not only were instructions requested and
given on this issue, but the instructions themselves placed
upon these plaintiffs a duty to see and to warn. Since
these plaintiffs testified that they had not seen and did
not have the opportunity to warn the driver, the instructions peremptorily directed the jury against these plaintiffs.
Even assuming the instructions were warranted on
the issue of contributory negligence, the instructions as
given were erroneous. Conduct that only contributes "to
any degree" or "to any extent, however slight," to produce the injury does not satisfy the requirement of proximate cause which normally demands that chargeable
conduct be ·a substantial factor in the limitless chain
of causation.
In giving instructions requested by the defendants,
the court committed prejudicial error. An error, though
conscientiously made cannot be believed sincerely enough
to make it any less an error. The plaintiffs suffered
serious injuries as a result of a collision caused by the
defendants. They should not be required to ·now suffer
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serious injustice as a result of erroneous instructions
requested by the defendants.
R~espectfully

submitted,

RICHARDS AND BIRD
and DAN S. BUS.HNELL
A copy of the foregoing Brief was mailed to Stewart, Cannon & Hanson and Ray, Quinney & Nebeker,
attorneys for defendants, this 30th day of June, 1954.
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